The slope of the sticky information Phillips curve proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) is based on the degree of information rigidity on the part of firms. Carroll (2003) uses an epidemiology model of expectations and finds evidence for the U.S. of a one-year lag in the transmission of information from professional forecasters to households. Using financial institutions' and firms' survey data from Peru and the model proposed by Carroll, I estimate the degree of information rigidity for the Peruvian economy. This paper also considers heterogeneous responses and explores the cross-sectional dimension of these survey forecasts. I find that the degree of information stickiness ranges between one and two quarters, a result that is robust to different specifications.
INTRODUCTION
During the past ten years, several papers have argued that sticky information models, in which agents update their information occasionally rather than instantaneously, explain some stylized facts about output and inflation dynamics. The research presented in this paper aims to estimate the slope of the Phillips curve, which in turn describes the relationship between inflation, economic activity, and expectations. Having the correct structural parameters allows a better understanding of the dynamics of inflation in various cases, such as in response to monetary policy shocks. Mankiw and Reis (2002, MR thereafter) pioneered the literature on sticky information modeling. Their work was motivated by the following stylized facts about inflation dynamics: (i) monetary policy actions require some time to have their full impact on inflation, (ii) there is a large and positive serial correlation in the inflation process, (iii) disinflation policies have contractionary effects, and (iv) monetary policy actions have their maximum effect on cyclical output before they have their maximum effect on inflation. MR proposed a structural explanation for these stylized facts based on information rigidities.
The first attempt to provide microfoundations for MR's (2002) model was Carroll (2003) and his epidemiological model of expectations. Carroll argues that the U.S. survey data on inflation expectations are consistent with a model in which each period, only a fraction of households adopt the superior inflation forecasts of experts. The experts' forecast is superior in the sense that they have better information available. The remaining households find it costly to update their information and continue using their own past expectations rather than forming better predictions. In this context, in order to make better predictions, an agent requires more time to formulate his analysis and better knowledge of other important information. Reis (2006b) also provides microfoundations for MR (2002) and argues that firms can rationally choose to be inattentive, and he derives the conditions for the optimal length of inattentiveness. MR (2007) conclude that the assumption of sticky information can be justified by the costs of acquiring, absorbing, and processing information (as in Reis, 2006a Reis, , 2006b or by appealing to the epidemiology of expectations (as in Carroll, 2003) . While Carroll's epidemiology model seems to be useful for modeling the U.S. and European data, appropriate work for developing countries is still lacking. While Carroll's model seems to fit the data between professional forecasters and households, corresponding work is still missing between professional forecasters and firms. To the best of my knowledge, information on firms' expectations is not available. I attempt to fill this gap by examining data on inflation expectations from Peru, for both professional forecasters and firm managers.
Regarding expectations, there has been an increasing interest in explaining the process by which agents form their inflation expectations, 1 mainly inspired by the evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis provided by survey expectations (Mankiw et al., 2004) . Branch (2007) bridges the sticky information and heterogeneous expectations literatures by presenting empirical evidence in favor of both heterogeneity modeling and limited information flows. Mankiw et al. (2004) , Carroll (2003) , and Döpke et al. (2008a) find evidence based on survey data supporting sticky information models. Nunes (2009b) , in contrast, obtains empirical evidence against these models, 2 while Inoue et al. (2009) claim that the correlation between households and professional forecasters' expectations found in Carroll (2003) is higher if consumption expenditure is considered a proxy for inflation expectations; 3 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008) find that mean forecasts fail to adjust in response to structural shocks which leads to different degrees of information rigidities; 4 and Lanne et al. (2009) provide results favoring a simple sticky information model.
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Most of the literature focuses on the diffusion of information from professional forecasters to households. However, models based on sticky information assume that information that is relevant to firms' pricing decisions is the information that diffuses slowly in the economy. Therefore, when choosing prices, firms may not immediately update their old information. The firm's decision is rational because of the costs associated with collecting updated information. The specification of inflation dynamics in this context is given by the sticky information Phillips curve (SIPC hereafter) in which current inflation depends not only on the current output gap but also on the past expectations of both current inflation and the growth rate of the current output gap from part of the firm. 6 My findings support the usefulness of Carroll's modeling strategy for the description of expectation dynamics between professional forecasters and firm 1 See MR (2006 MR ( , 2007 and Branch (2007) . 2 Nunes (2009a) proposes a model of expectations based on a rational forecast and on a learning component. That model is then used in Nunes (2009b) and the author argues that this model provides a better fit of the data. 3 Inoue et al. (2009) claim that households with a lower level of education do not have the incentives to incorporate news into the report of their inflation expectations. 4 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) expand the analysis to explain the effects of the Great Moderation on expectations and present evidence of state-dependence in the process of forming expectations. 5 Lanne et al. (2009) define simple sticky information as the situation in which a significant proportion of households base their inflation expectations on the past release of actual inflation rather than on the rational forward-looking forecast. For a recent survey in the past decade on imperfect information models, see MR (2010) . 6 Walsh (2010) shows that the conclusions of the sticky information models are sensitive to the slope of the Phillips curve. managers in Peru. I find that firm managers' inflation expectations adjust slowly relative to the more precise expectations of professional forecasters. This paper presents evidence of information rigidity between these two agents at both the aggregate and the sectoral levels of economic activity. As a robustness check on my result, I use firm-level data and test different specifications of the model. I argue that the lag in the response of one group with respect to the other group is a valid approximation for the level of information rigidity in the Peruvian economy. Peru is an economy with two high inflation periods (1988 and 1992) , a relatively recent independent central bank (in 1992), and an explicit inflation target scheme (since 2002) . This study covers a period of relatively low inflation and estimates the transmission of expectations between two groups of agents: financial institutions that do business based on a better knowledge and understanding of the Peruvian economy and the less informed managers of firms, who are the agents who set prices in the economy.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the baseline epidemiology model and the basis for information transmission between two groups: financial institutions and firm managers; sections 3 and 4 present the data, methodology, and estimation of the epidemiology model; and section 5 presents my conclusions.
THEORY

The Carroll Model
In the Carroll (2003) epidemiology model, information goes from professional forecasters to consumers. Expectations dynamics are well captured by a model in which the perception of households is derived from news reports on the views of professional forecasters. So people occasionally pay attention to news reports, and this inattention generates stickiness in aggregate expectations.
In this paper, I depart slightly from Carroll's model and, rather than households' expectations, I take into account those of firm managers (FMs hereafter). In the original model, an individual consumer can be thought of as an information price taker given his low bargaining power in the market for goods. I argue that even though FMs are not price takers in the market for goods, they are still information price takers. In New Keynesian models, each firm is the sole producer of one individual good (intermediate or final) that cannot be perfectly substituted by the variety produced by another firm. Information is different. Multiple economic agents (FMs and professional forecasters) may potentially produce inflation forecasts. But the forecast that contains more precise information renders all inferior forecasts useless. In that case, the best forecast produced by the best forecaster is not only a substitute, it also completely dominates all other forecasts. Then, if a firm manager (FM hereafter) realizes that another agent (a professional forecaster) produces better inflation forecasts, it is rational for him to give up the task of forecasting and be an information taker.
Another way of thinking about FMs as information takers is the case of many FMs. In this case, the decision of one FM may affect his own expectations about his own future price, but given the epidemiology of information diffusion, a FM may or may not be aware of the change in pricing decisions of other FMs. In other words, his expectations about his own price cannot influence his expected value of the aggregate inflation index (i.e., each FM is an information taker of the future aggregate inflation forecast). If each FM affects only an infinitesimal proportion of aggregate prices, it is perfectly sensible for them to ignore their effect on the aggregate. Therefore, only a fraction of FMs are infected by the diffusion of news on inflation, and this fraction will update their inflation expectations, as do the households in Carroll (2003) .
Following Carroll's model, I assume that most FMs form their expectations about future inflation by reading newspaper articles, that every inflation article contains a complete forecast of the inflation rate for all future years, and that at any given period of time each FM encounters and absorbs the contents of an inflation article with probability , then the following holds:
where is the inflation rate between quarter t and quarter t+1, is the aggregate price index in period t, then , is the mean value of inflation expectations of FMs for quarter t+1 during the quarter t, and is the newspaper forecast printed in time t for inflation in s ≥ t. An equation similar to (1) can be written for projections of the inflation rate over the next year:
, ,
, where , is the FM's forecast (expectation), for a FM who updates his view from a news report in t.
Taking into account the interactive term, replacing with , and assuming that the newspaper forecast is the only source of updating information:
FMs' mean of inflation expectations for the next year should be a weighted average between their current "rational" forecast and their last period's mean measuring inflation expectations. As in Carroll's model, new information about inflation spreads across FMs in the following "epidemiological" way: in each period, only a fraction λ of FMs update their inflation expectations to the latest inflation forecasts, and the remaining (1-λ) FMs stick to their forecasts from the previous period.
IDENTIFICATION AND DATA CHARACTERISTICS
Before estimating λ in this section, I first describe the strategy for approaching the epidemiology model and then present some preliminary results that support this model. In the next section, I use these results for estimating (2).
Identification strategy
Estimating (2) requires an identification of data sources for firms' mean inflation expectations and for newspaper forecasts of inflation over the next year. The Central Reserve Bank of Peru conducts a monthly survey of the general managers of large firms intended to be representative of the Peruvian economy. One component of the survey asks the managers what they expect the inflation rate to be at the end of the year and during the next year. I use the mean inflation forecast from this survey as a proxy for , . To identify the "newspaper" forecast for next-year inflation, I use the mean of the one-year-ahead inflation forecast from the survey of financial institutions. The survey, also conducted by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru, has collected and summarized forecasts from leading banks, pension fund managers, and other financial institutions since 1999. The survey questionnaire is distributed once a month and responses are due within 10 days. The central bank asks participants for monthly and annual forecasts of inflation for the end of the year and the next year.
As noted above, a newspaper article on inflation interviews "experts" on inflation, who in turn provide the reasoning behind their predictions. Such experts are usually people who forecast the economy for a living, so the pool of interviewees is likely to be approximately the same group of forecasters whose views are summarized by the survey of financial institutions. In the survey sent to the general managers of firms, there is no question about the 12-month estimate of the inflation rate for firms. For financial institutions, this question has been included in the survey since June 2009. However, the survey taken at the end of December allows me to capture the answers as the one-year-ahead forecast. On the other hand, the central bank asks 8 In the particular case of Peru, each financial institution has an economic studies department. This department produces a report that includes the institutions' views on the economy as a whole and its expected values for key variables, especially at the end of each fiscal quarter. Such reports coincide with the publication of the firm's balance sheet. 9 The inflation rate refers to the 12-month growth rate of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Figures 1 and 2 show that the distribution of both financial institutions' and FMs' forecasts are symmetric around a central value. Table 2 2.5-3.0[[3.0-3.5[[3.5-4 .0]]4.0-4.5 [[4.5-5.0[[5.0-5.5[[5.5-6 .0][6.0-6.5 [[6.5-7.0[[7.0-7.5[[7.5-8.0[[8.0-8.5[[8.5-9.0[[9.0-9 5-5.0[[5.0-5.5[[5.5-6 .0][6.0-6.5 [[6.5-7.0[[7.0-7.5[[7.5-8.0[[8.0-8.5[[8.5-9.0[[9.0-9. [[4.5-5.0[[5.0-5.5[[5.5-6 .0][6.0-6.5 [[6.5-7.0[[7.0-7.5[[7.5-8.0[[8.0-8.5[[8.5-9.0[[9.0-9 [[0.5-1.0[[1.0-1.5[[1.5-2.0[[2.0-2.5[[2.5-3.0[[3.0-3.5[[3.5-4 .0]]4.0-4.5 [[4.5-5.0[[5.0-5.5[[5.5-6.0][6.0-6.5[[6.5-7.0[[7.0-7.5[[7.5-8.0[[8.0-8.5[[8.5-9.0[[9.0-9.5 [4.5-5.0[[5.0-5.5[[5.5-6 .0][6.0-6.5 [[6.5-7.0[[7.0-7.5[[7.5-8.0[[8.0-8.5[[8.5-9.0[[9.0-9. 2.5-3.0[[3.0-3.5[[3.5-4 .0]]4.0-4.5 [[4.5-5.0[[5.0-5.5[[5.5-6 .0][6.0-6.5 [[6.5-7.0[[7.0-7.5[[7.5-8.0[[8.0-8.5[[8.5-9.0[[9.0-9 5-5.0[[5.0-5.5[[5.5-6 .0][6.0-6.5 [[6.5-7.0[[7.0-7.5[[7.5-8.0[[8.0-8.5[[8.5-9.0[[9.0-9. [[4.5-5.0[[5.0-5.5[[5.5-6 .0][6.0-6.5 [[6.5-7.0[[7.0-7.5[[7.5-8.0[[8.0-8.5[[8.5-9.0[[9.0-9 [[0.5-1.0[[1.0-1.5[[1.5-2.0[[2.0-2.5[[2.5-3.0[[3.0-3.5[[3.5-4 .0]]4.0-4.5 [[4.5-5.0[[5.0-5.5[[5.5-6.0][6.0-6.5[[6.5-7.0[[7.0-7.5[[7.5-8.0[[8.0-8.5[[8.5-9.0[[9.0-9.5 [ 2010 summary statistics as well and confirms that the mean, median, and mode are similar in value.
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FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' EXPECTATIONS ON INFLATION
NOTES: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' EXPECTATIONS ARE ONE-YEAR-AHEAD FORECASTS OF INFLATION, TAKEN ON DECEMBER OF EACH YEAR. THE DARK LINE IS THE REALIZATION OF CPI
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The cross-sectional dispersion of the FMs' answers is larger than the dispersion of financial institutions' answers from all years. The disagreement or uncertainty about inflation among FMs is larger than the disagreement among financial institutions regarding future inflation. Figure 3 reports the dispersion in the answers of both groups and shows that FMs' responses are more dispersed. In 
Extrapolation of the data
In order to investigate whether Carroll's model is a reasonable approximation of inflation expectations, I build a one-year-ahead forecast of inflation expectations based on the assumptions made originally in Carroll (2003) . The hypothetical FM's expectation is that the true inflation rate over the next year is given by:
, If the FM's forecast of the inflation rate is equal to his forecast of the fundamental inflation rate ( , ) then The current forecast is a weighted average between the current-year forecast and the next-year prediction. For example, for the case of the expected inflation for year t, it is possible to infer:
Given the data characteristics, and in line with Carroll's model, it is possible to split the forecast of the inflation for a one-year horizon made in quarter two of year t as follows:
Taking expected values, the inflation expectation of a one-year horizon made by an agent is the weighted average between his expectation for year t and for year t+1. 
Then for quarters two and three, this approach would give the following results: This extrapolation approach is used for both financial institutions and FMs, at the aggregate level. Sector-and firm-level expectations for FMs are also extrapolated following this mechanism.
Preliminary analysis
The new extrapolated data are now analyzed. In Table 3 , Panel A, the correlation coefficient is higher between financial institutions' forecast and the most recent information of CPI inflation than it is between FMs' forecasts and CPI inflation. In contrast, the correlation is similar between financial institutions' and FMs' expectations. This evidence suggests that professional forecasters update faster than FMs to the fundamental inflation, which is consistent with Carroll's (2003) model. Nunes (2009b) argues that households are more accurate at forecasting CPI inflation but not core inflation, contradicting Carroll's results. Nunes uses the mean squared error (MSE) and compares the mean and median in the household survey conducted by the University of Michigan and the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. When using the median, Nunes finds that the MSE between households' forecasts and CPI inflation is lower than those between professional forecasters and CPI inflation. The results are reversed when core inflation is considered.
In Table 2 , Panel B, I present the same test for both sample groups and both measures of central tendency. The financial institutions are always more accurate in their predictions. Mankiw et al. (2004) present an exercise during the transition of the Volcker disinflation on how the distribution of inflation expectations in households evolves. During the transition, the distribution of the households' responses became approximately bi-modal. This fact would explain the consistency of my results compared to Nunes', because the distribution of inflation expectations in my study is symmetric for the case of the FMs, which explains why the mean and median would be the same.
Another potential explanation for the financial institutions' inflation expectations is that they observe FMs' expectations first in order to build their own expectations. It is possible to argue that the relationship between FMs and the research departments of financial institutions is a channel that would work in both directions.
A way to test the suggested structure of the epidemiology model (expectations are assumed to spread from financial institutions' research departments to the FMs) is to test that the financial institutions' forecasts Grangercause the managers' forecasts but not vice versa. I test the joint significance of the following equations: 
ESTIMATIONS AND EMPIRICS
The news about inflation can be thought of as a disease that spreads slowly across the FMs, infecting a fraction of all the FMs in each period. Therefore (2) is directly estimable, assuming an appropriate proxy for newspaper expectations can be found and can be thought of as the degree of information rigidity of the expectations of the FMs with respect to the professional forecasters. 
Degree of information stickiness
I now turn to the main question, which is whether the FMs' survey data can be reasonably well represented by the reduced-form model represented by (2). As Döpke et al. (2008a) point out, the choice of the appropriate empirical strategy depends on the time series properties of the underlying expectations. If the series are stationary, (2) can be estimated directly by OLS (as in Carroll, 2003) . If they are non-stationary (I(1)) and cointegrated, the model should be transformed into the vector error-correction (VEC) form. 14 12 At two lags, there is no evidence of serial correlation in residuals. The VEC setup of section 4 provides an additional piece of supportive evidence that causality runs from financial institutions to FMs. 13 Regarding the estimation of information rigidity, most work about sticky information uses time series analysis. Khan and Zhu (2006) , Coibion (2010) , Döpke et al. (2008b), and Carrera (2010) use non-linear OLS for estimating the degree of information rigidity. Kiley (2007) employs a maximum likelihood methodology. Kiley (2007) also suggests that in environments of relatively low inflation, the degree of information rigidity tends to increase. 14 Döpke et al. (2008a) The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests suggest that the series of expectations are stationary. For the sample period that this study covers, cointegration techniques are not recommended. Having found supportive preliminary evidence for the epidemiological model of expectations formation in the previous subsections, I estimate the speed of information updating, the lambda parameter in (2).
To provide a baseline for comparison, Equation 1 of Table 5 presents the results for the simplest possible model: the value of the FMs' forecasts , is equal to a constant, . The point estimate of the constant is 2.8 percent, which is close to the center of the inflation band (2.5 percent) announced by the central bank in 2002.
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The parameter is statistically significant and, as expected, the is equal to zero. By way of example, the test performed for the benchmark expectations-constant model is whether the average value of the expectations index is zero, 0. This proposition can be rejected with a high degree of statistical confidence (a ρ-value consistent with the probability that the proposition is true is essentially zero).
I begin to examine the baseline model's ability to explain the FMs' data by estimating:
where , and , are the corresponding FMs' and financial institutions' forecasts. Comparing this to (2) provides the testable restriction that: 1
Results from the estimation of (6) are presented as Equation 2. The point estimates of 0.58 and 0.45 suggest that the restriction (7) is very close to holding true, and the last column presents formal statistical evidence about the restriction: it shows that the statistical significance with which the proposition that 1 can be rejected is about 0.33, so that the restriction is easily accommodated by the data at a level of significance of 0.05 or greater. 16 paper is to test the validity of Carroll's epidemiology model and estimate this model using both empirical strategies. 15 In 2007, the central bank announced a lower inflation target (2 percent) with the same band (1 percent below and over the target). 16 The Q-stat indicates that there is no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals, which is impressive because the individual series involved have very high degrees of serial correlation. This may suggest that the two variables are cointegrated, as would be expected if one were a distributed lag of the other. The ADF results, on the other hand, suggest that these series are stationary.
The above results can be interpreted as a level of information rigidity of little less than two quarters for the Peruvian economy. In other words, all FMs require approximately half a year on average in order to update information.
Another plausible modification to the model is to allow for the possibility that some FMs update their expectations to the most recent past inflation rate rather than to the financial institutions' forecast of the future inflation rate. Since most news coverage of inflation is prompted by the release of past inflation statistics (and since the new past number is often in the headline of the news article), one may argue that it seems more likely for people to update their expectations to the most recent inflation rate than to a forecast of the future rate. This result would be in line with a model of "adaptive expectations."
The epidemiology model assumes that FMs believe that professional forecasters have the most information regarding the inflation process, so their predictions are more accurate than expectations based on the past history of inflation. Therefore, updating FMs could still believe that the financial institution forecast is better than the adaptively rational forecast. Another possible alternative is some "learning" process from the FMs; so they may take into account past forecast error in order to make their predictions today. As suggested in Carroll (2003) and Nunes (2009b) , it is possible to write comprenhensive specifications that include adaptive and learning processes by estimating an equation of the form:
where represents the most recently published annual inflation rate as of time t and , is the actual forecast error. Results from estimating (8) are presented in the rest of the equations of Table 5 . The results in Equation 3 rule out the possibility that financial institutions' forecasts are not significant if a constant is added. Equation 4 takes into account the possibility that FMs consider the most recent inflation information rather than the forecasts of professional forecasters. In terms of the model, this may imply a prediction of the fundamental inflation rate. Financial institutions' forecasts of future inflation are still a significant determinant of the FMs' forecasts, while actual inflation remains not significant. Similar results hold if rather than past inflation, the forecast error is considered, as is shown in Equation 5 .
From Equations 6 and 7, neither the past inflation rates nor the forecast errors are statistically significant determinants of the FMs' expected inflation rates even if the lagged value of the FMs' forecast is considered.
Equation 8 shows that when the financial institutions' predictions are entirely absent, the current inflation rate has explanatory power for the FMs' forecast of the inflation rate. Equation 9 shows that this is not the case for the forecast error.
In sum, it seems fair to argue that the simple "sticky expectations" described in (2) does a good job by capturing much of the predictable behavior of the FMs' inflation expectations. In all of the specifications estimated, financial institutions' expectations are a significant determinant of FMs' inflation expectations.
Heterogeneous expectations: Industry level
In this section, I expand Carroll's model to the industry level. In addition to understanding aggregate behavior, it is interesting to understand results at the industry level. It is interesting to learn whether there are big differences among industries and, if there are, whether such differences can be explained by some key factors.
It is also possible that different FMs have different incentives to update information, which in turn affects FMs' expectations. A first approach would be to differentiate FMs according to the economic activity they perform. A similar approach that partitions the survey sample into sub-samples by potentially different content of information can be found in Inoue et al. (2009). 17 I estimate seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in order to consider possible aggregate effects (i.e., cross-sectional correlation in the residuals) for testing Carroll's model per sector, and I find that the data still support the main constraint in (7). As expected, the level of rigidity varies between sectors. In Table 6 , FMs that update faster to the financial institutions' forecast are firms involved in manufacturing processes and natural resources extractive activities. The sectors with the highest information rigidity are trade and construction. The level of information rigidity considering all sectors ranges between one and two quarters.
The differences between information stickiness from different sectors are then tested. A Wald test evaluates the null hypothesis that is the same for all regressions. I reject that hypothesis with a 5 percent statistical significance, implying a different speed of information updating between sectors. In order to determine the sources of the heterogeneity across sectors, I test whether the information rigidity of firms that belongs to one particular sector is associated with specific characteristics of each sector. I first compare the level of information rigidity with the level of disagreement in FMs who carry out different economic activities. In Figure 4 a regression line suggests a negative relationship, implying that in sectors where there are more disagreements, the expected time for updating expectations would be higher.
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I also compare the level of information rigidity against a proxy for markup.
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Sectors that display a higher markup are also sectors with a longer lag in updating information, as suggested in Figure 5 . 20 The final test I propose is to consider the possibility of forecast errors made by different firms in different sectors. As expected, I find that firms that update more slowly, made worse forecasts than firms which update faster to the projections made by professional forecasters. In Figure 6 , I show that this relationship is statistically significant. 19 I take the proportion between the excess in profits relative to the aggregate value generated per economic activity from the last input-output table for the Peruvian economy as a proxy for the markup on a specific industry. 20 Manufacturing firms have to compete with imported products, which would explain a higher degree of competition and a lower markup relative to other economic activities. Even though there are no large variations in either disagreements or markup per industry, there is some suggestive evidence from the forecast errors made by FMs of different sectors that the cross-sectional dimension of FMs' responses has to be tested in the context of panel data. By doing so, I might correct any potential bias due to the systematic forecast error of some FMs. 21 21 Notice that these results are sensible to the inclusion of energy. FMs of these firms tend to be outliers in the sample. This analysis is suggestive rather than conclusive and motivates the next panel analysis section. 
Heterogeneous expectations: Firm level
In order to rule out any type of consistent over-(under-)predictions on the part of any individual FM (or group of FMs), which in turn bias the results from the time series regression, I estimate a panel of at least 38 percent of whom responded during the sample period.
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The strategy is to consider any type of consistent, yet significant pattern in FMs' answers. I estimate different fixed effect specifications to account for those patterns. The work of Lahiri and Liu (2006) and Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) also explore the cross-dimension of inflation expectations at the individual forecasting level.
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22 This ad hoc cut-off of FMs is intended to evaluate the responses of FMs who consistently participate in the survey. In order to check robustness, I estimate the panel for a higher level of responses and the results remain the same. The fixed effects models frequently have too many cross-sectional units of observations requiring too many dummy variables for their specification. Too many dummy variables may deprive the model of a sufficient number of degrees of freedom for adequate statistical tests to be conducted and may be subject to multicollinearity, which increases the standard errors and thereby drains the model even more of statistical power to test parameters. 23 Even though Lahiri and Liu (2006) and Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) focus on explaining inflation uncertainty, using survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), they both take into account the cross-sectional variation in their studies. Lahiri and Liu find that the The new baseline specification, which considers the cross-dimension at the FM level, following (2), is:
where , is redefined as the forecast of inflation for FM i between t and t+4.
The results are reported in Table 7 . In Equation 1, I consider a panel model with constant coefficients, referring to both intercepts and slopes. This specification assumes that neither firm nor temporal effects are statistically significant. In Equation 2 the panel model has constant slopes but intercepts that differ according to the cross-sectional unit (group firm). This specification considers the case of significant differences among FMs, i.e., allows the intercept to be cross-section specific and in this case differs from firm to firm. However, it may or may not differ over time. The type of fixed effects model in Equation 3 has constant slopes but intercepts that differ according to time. In this case, the model has no significant firm differences, but might have autocorrelation due to time-lagged temporal effects. The residuals of this kind of specification may have autocorrelation. In this case, the variables are homogeneous across the FMs. They could be similar in region or area of focus. For example, technological changes or national policies would lead to group-specific characteristics that may affect temporal changes in the FMs' expectations. Equation 4 is another fixed effects panel model in which the slope coefficients are constant, but the intercept varies over firms as well as over time.
persistence in forecast uncertainty is much lower than what the aggregate time series data would suggest. They use a panel of density forecasts from the SPF. Capistrán and Timmermann show that the conditional variance of inflation, the conditional mean of the inflation rate, and the crosssectional dispersion in inflation beliefs are positively related at the forecaster level. Table 7 shows the results for all of these fixed effect specifications. In all of them, the forecasts of financial institutions remain significant, with the expected sign and with values around the time series regression estimation. Equation 1 in Table 7 shows a point estimate of 0.55, which suggests a level of information rigidity close to two quarters. The data on expectations accommodate reasonably well Carroll's epidemiology model and give a reasonable length of the degree of information rigidity of the Peruvian economy. Döpke et al. (2008a) argue that the testing strategy (co-integration analysis or stationary OLS regressions) depends not only on the underlying properties of the time series but also on the model under investigation. By construction, Carroll's model assumes a unit root. It can be argued that unit root tests are often inconclusive about the time series properties and a vector error correction (VEC) representation can be safely estimated because it works under non-stationary as well as stationary conditions. Let us assume that there is a unit root. A model based on the assumption of a unit root in the inflation-expectation process is estimated and analyzed using cointegration techniques. In the epidemiological model, the expectations of professionals and FMs must have the co-integration vector (1, −1) . where , denotes the vector of loading coefficients and is a matrix lag polynomial. Then determines the speed of adjustment toward the (long-run) equilibrium. The parameter of interest, in this case, is because it determines the speed of adjustment observed for FMs with respect to financial institutions. As mentioned before, should be equal to (1,-1) because FMs completely adapt to the financial institutions' forecast in the long run.
Degree of information stickiness: Vector error correction analysis
I estimate a VEC (see Table 8 ). The Johansen test suggests one cointegrating vector and the restriction 1, 1 is supported in the data. The value for is -1.03, almost the same as the value predicted by the model. As a matter of fact, the likelihood ratio statistic provides evidence that is not significantly different from 1, 1 .
The estimate of is statistically significant and is 0.37, which implies periods of little more than two quarters for adjustment, which is higher than implied by the stationary result. 
CONCLUSIONS
A central topic in macroeconomics is the role of private agents' expectations at both the disaggregate and aggregate levels because a better understanding of those expectations also allows a better understanding of structural relationships in the economy. The recent literature on sticky information indicates an important role for the behavior of expectations, especially those arising from firms. Here, I Carroll's (2003) epidemiologic model of expectations and estimate the information rigidity between financial institutions and the FMs of firms using data from Peru. In this model, there is information rigidity in the sense that financial institutions devote significant resources to updating information, which in turn affects their expectations, but these new expectations are imperfectly transmitted to the managers of private firms. Information rigidities lead a group of firms to set prices based on past information. The environment in which a FM operates may affect the timing at which this FM updates his information set. Moreover, heterogeneity in the timing may arise at the firm and/or industry level for three reasons: (i) some FMs set prices with the best information available, while others have no incentives to incur in additional costs for updating information, which would lead to dispersion at the industry level (level of disagreements), (ii) some FMs face more competition, which lowers the markup and the incentive for managers to be more up to date (the markup level), and/or (iii) some FMs may not have incentives to reveal the true value of their expectations on inflation and therefore have systematic errors in forecasting (differences in mean squared error). Considering these heterogeneities may give a more robust estimate of the information rigidity in the Peruvian economy.
The data support the restriction suggested by Carroll's epidemiology model and suggest a level of information rigidity of around half a year (ranging from one to two quarters). I find that financial institutions' expectations and past expectations of the FMs are significant determinants of the FMs' expectations, a result that is robust to different specifications. At the cross-section level, responses about expectations have symmetric distributions for all years, and the data suggest that at high levels of inflation, the level of the inflation forecast increases as does the disagreement between agents.
With heterogeneous FMs (i.e., FMs that belong to different industries), the epidemiologic model closely matches the data on FMs' expectations, with relatively short deviations from the aggregate parameter of the degree of information rigidity. This model succeeds in part because responses about future rates of inflation are on average close to the prediction of the aggregate level. I also consider the disagreement and the markup at the industry level, in order to be more consistent with the data along a number of dimensions. I find a negative relationship in both cases, which suggests a role for testing the cross-dimension in a panel with fixed effects. The results from different fixed effects panel data specifications confirm the robustness of the results found in the time series analysis.
The last exercise I consider is VEC analysis. Assuming a unit root in the inflation expectation series, I test if the epidemiology model is still a valid representation. Carroll's model also does a good job at this stage because the cointegrating vector that matches the data is consistent with the epidemiology model. This model of transmission and expectations suggests that information frictions matter for understanding certain features of FMs' expectations. Future research should study more closely how agents update their information about variables other than inflation. Understanding how financial institutions' expectations evolve relative to rational expectations will also shed light on the evolution of FMs' expectations. Consistent with Easaw and Ghoshray (2006) , it would be interesting to test these two groups of agents' expectations with different types of shocks and document those results. Finally, Mankiw and Reis (2007) develop a general equilibrium model based on sticky information that replicates the level of disagreement on the household survey expectations. Estimating the level of disagreements of FMs based on a sticky information general equilibrium model would be the natural next step of this research.
APPENDIX I -HIGH INFLATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
The Peruvian economy suffered a period of hyperinflation during 1988 and 1992, as a result of a combination of heterodox policies and a "low" level of institutions' credibility. In 1988, there was a spiral of "bad" news followed by a shock in expectations, which resulted in a higher level of prices. In 1992, the high level of inflation was announced and several managed prices were set to free-market levels, an action that initially induced a period of high inflation and lower levels of inflation thereafter. The central government announced the independence of the central bank, and since then, the bank's main objective has been price stability.
Since 2002, the Peruvian economy has experienced different structural changes regarding monetary policy. One of those changes was the announcement of an explicit inflation target of 2.5 percent with a band of 1 percent above and below.
reduced. Figure 1A also shows that the response of expectations to movements in inflation outside the band is asymmetric. 25 Therefore, the period 2001-2010 is considered a period of relatively low inflation (with a mean of 2.3 percent) and low volatility (a standard deviation of 2.1) and a historical record of deflation in 2001 (see Table 1A ). Regarding expectations, they are mostly symmetric and unimodal for both financial institutions and managers of firms. 5-2.0[ [2.0-2.5[ [2.5-3.0[ [3.0-3.5[ [3.5-4 .0] ]4.0-4.5 [ [4.5-5.0[ [5.0-5.5[ [5.5-6.0] 
